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Demand for smartwatches has taken o￿ in recent years with new models which can run independently from smartphones
and provide more useful features, becoming ￿rst-class mobile platforms. One can access online banking or even make
payments on a smartwatch without a paired phone.￿is makes smartwatches more a￿ractive and vulnerable to malicious
a￿acks, which to date have been largely overlooked. In this paper, we demonstrate Snoopy, a password extraction and
inference system which is able to accurately infer passwords entered on Android/Apple watches within 20 a￿empts, just by
eavesdropping on motion sensors. Snoopy uses a uniform framework to extract the segments of motion data when passwords
are entered, and uses novel deep neural networks to infer the actual passwords. We evaluate the proposed Snoopy system in
the real-world with data from 362 participants and show that our system o￿ers a ⇠ 3-fold improvement in the accuracy of
inferring passwords compared to the state-of-the-art, without consuming excessive energy or computational resources. We
also show that Snoopy is very resilient to user and device heterogeneity: it can be trained on crowd-sourced motion data (e.g.
via Amazon Mechanical Turk), and then used to a￿ack passwords from a new user, even if they are wearing a di￿erent model.
￿is paper shows that, in the wrong hands, Snoopy can potentially cause serious leaks of sensitive information. By raising
awareness, we invite the community and manufacturers to revisit the risks of continuous motion sensing on smart wearable
devices.
CCS Concepts: •Security and privacy→Authentication; •Human-centered computing→Mobile devices;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smartwatches are becoming increasingly ubiquitous: it is expected that the global smartwatch market has a
potential to reach $32.9 billion by 2020 [30].￿ey are now deeply embedded in our daily lives, and over time
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Fig. 1. An example of motion sensor data changes induced by swiping a pa￿ern-lock on a smartwatch. Tapping or swiping
passwords does not follow uniform motion and is very challenging to distinguish individual digits, let alone reveal the entire
code.
can accumulate a variety of sensitive and important information such as emails, contacts and payment details.
Due to their current role as an extension to the smartphones, the security and privacy of smartwatches have
been overlooked, and instead delegated to the paired phones. However, driven by the major players such as
Google and Apple, smartwatches are becoming more independent and can act as ￿rst class citizens in the mobile
ecosystem: they are no long just secondary displays, but are able to o￿er all basic functionalities without the
presence of smartphones. For instance, it is already possible to pay via a smartwatch without even needing
to carry a smartphone [2, 6, 11], and many recent apps on smartwatches such as ￿tness tracking, well-being
monitoring, and messaging (email/text) apps can work independently of phone usage.
￿ese increased functionalities make smartwatches more useful, but also a￿ract malicious a￿acks which
traditionally target smartphone class devices only. Smartwatches are typically secured using a 4 digit PIN or
a pa￿ern lock, e.g., Android Pa￿ern Locks (APLs). ￿ese are used not only to unlock the phone, but also to
authenticate the payments. In practice, the consequences of such an a￿ack can be more serious than just security
breach of the smartwatch screen lock [33]: as shown in our user study (discussed in Sec. 7), over 80% of 745
anonymous participants have a frequent habit of reusing the same passwords across services e.g. PayPal, card
payments e.g. ATM PIN codes or even physical security e.g. home alarm systems.￿erefore compromising a
smartwatch password could lead to a series of cyber and physical a￿acks.
￿ere has been a solid body of work on the similar problem of a￿acking passwords on smartphones, including
analysing oily residues on the screen [4], video footage [43], radio signal perturbations [19] and motion sensor
data [8]. In particular, a￿acking passwords by eavesdropping motion data is popular, since motion sensors are
commonly sampled by a wide variety of applications, e.g. those designed for positioning, ￿tness tracking and
activity recognition. In addition, giving access to on-board motion sensors appears to be innocuous, and many
users (76% according to our user study) would grant instantly. Motion sensors leak information about the location
of events such as taps through small changes in orientation and impacts. Existing techniques for cracking PINs
on smartphones typically segment digits by extracting tap events and then use the extracted features to tell
which digit has been pressed. As such, existing techniques rely on signi￿cantly handcra￿ed features and ad hoc
approaches for digit segmentation.
Smartwatches with their smaller form factor compound the password classi￿cation problem, making it far
more challenging than the smartphone case. Fig. 1 shows examples where the motion sensor data changes as
the user swipes an APL on a smartwatch. As can be seen, the motion induced by password entries is small and
not easily segmented. Fig. 2 highlights this by considering the signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio of motion sensors
on di￿erent devices. We see that motion signals on smartwatches are far noisier, and can be 20-40dB worse
than that of smartphones or high-end IMUs. In the presence of such low SNR, existing techniques designed for
smartphones [8] typically fail to work. ￿is is due to the reliance on hand-engineered features, which are not
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Fig. 2. Signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of motion sensors on smartphones, high-end IMUs and smartwatches. Le￿: Accelerometers;
Right: Gyroscopes
robust to variability across users and devices, particularly given the much weaker and noisier motion signals on
smartwatches.
Although there are a number of papers which look at cracking PINs on smartphones, to date, only one paper
has considered the issue of revealing APLs.￿is is because APLs can have an arbitrary length and hence have
signi￿cantly more possible combinations e.g. 60 passwords vs 10k for a 4 digit PIN. In this paper, we provide a
universal data driven technique for inferring both APLs and PINs on smartwatches.￿is requires no handcra￿ed
feature extraction or digit segmentation and is able to generalize well to the problem of arbitrary length APLs,
even when faced with the extremely low SNRs found on smartwatches. Our novel deep learning approach, based
on recurrent neural networks (RNNs), exhibits a 3-4 fold increase in accuracy compared with the state-of-the-art.
We propose two di￿erent architectures.￿e ￿rst exploits the skewed distribution of passwords to perform entire
passwords inference. ￿is technique shows superior results on popular passwords. ￿e second is capable of
digit level inference i.e. it can generalize to any password that may or may not be present in a training database.
Although we have only considered the challenges of smartwatches in this paper, this technique would easily
work on the high SNR signals found on smartphones as well. In addition, we propose an adaptive motion sensing
technique to detect the password in low sampling rate and it only sends motion data of the candidate password
events to the server, minimizing ba￿ery and bandwidth usage to mimic a Trojan ￿tness app more readily. In
summary, the contributions of this paper are:
• We present Snoopy, the ￿rst system that demonstrates the feasibility of intercepting password information
entered on smartwatches by sensing resulting motion data.
• Snoopy is also the ￿rst approach that can infer universal APLs, a signi￿cantly more di￿cult problem
than PINs, due to the challenges of digit segmentation.
• We propose a universal password inference mechanism based on deep recurrent neural networks that
is able to a￿ack PINs and APLs. We present two variants, one which cracks popular passwords and
another which infers arbitrary passwords. Our system does not require any handcra￿ed features, only a
crowdsourced training dataset.
• We have conducted a user study and collected over 1,000 answered questionnaires, which shows that the
a￿ected population of smartwatch users is nonnegligible and the majority of users are not aware of the
potential password leak on smartwatches via motion data and its consequences.
• We have extensively evaluated the proposed Snoopy system, using data from over 360 distinct participants
and > 60K password entries on both Android and Apple devices. Our results show that the Snoopy
achieves a 3-4 fold improvement in correctly inferred passwords compared to competing techniques.
￿e remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec. 2 covers the technical background, while Sec. 3 presents
the overview of the proposed Snoopy system. Sec. 4 proposes a uniform approach to extracting the relevant part
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of the motion signal that corresponds to entering PINs and APLs. Sec. 5 proposes two models of inferring the
actual contents of passwords using deep neural networks. Sec. 6 evaluates the proposed extraction and inference
approaches and compares them with competing state-of-the-art methods. Sec. 7 reports the results of our user
study, while Sec. 8 discusses the energy/accuracy tradeo￿ of Snoopy and possible countermeasures. Finally, Sec. 9
presents an overview of related work, and Sec. 10 concludes the paper and points to directions for future work.
2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Tapped vs. Swiped Passwords
￿ere are two predominant types of password input mechanism on smartwatches (also on smartphones): tapped
and swiped passwords [39].
For iOS platforms, the default password type is four digit PIN, where the users tap their passwords on the
screen when prompted. A four digit PIN has 10, 000 possible combinations. It is possible to use longer passwords,
but in this paper, we only consider the four digit PIN.
For the Android platform, users have the option to use a PIN or a graphical pa￿ern lock (also known as APL),
where the users swipe a pa￿ern over a three-by-three matrix of dots (see Fig.1 for an example). Unlike the
numerical passwords where the users can choose freely from ten possible digits at each tap, the smartwatch
operating systems typically have certain constraints over the trajectories of the swiped pa￿erns. For instance
as shown in Fig.1, starting from the top le￿ dot, it is only possible to swipe towards four reachable neighbours:
the immediate right and the three dots in the second row. ￿erefore, the size of the search space for swiped
passwords is restricted to a maximum of 389, 112 [4].
In practice, for both PINs and APLs, if one fails to input the correct password three times the smartwatch
will prevent any further a￿empts for a few minutes. When the number of failed a￿empts reaches a threshold,
typically ten, the smartwatch can enter ‘lost’ mode, e.g. erase all data.
2.2 Motion Induced by Password Input
Intuitively, entering both tapped and swiped passwords will induce forces and orientation changes on the
smartwatch [37]. Since human skin has a certain level of elasticity, tapping on the smartwatch screen will cause
minor displacement at the contact point along the vertical direction, i.e. the watch body will rotate for a small
angle. Tapping causes an underdamped impulsive wave to develop, which causes small oscillations, shown in
Fig. 1. On the other hand, when swiping passwords, the pressing and friction force between the user’s ￿nger and
touch screen will “drag” the smartwatch to move along both vertical and horizontal directions.￿is gives rise to
small slip-pulse waves which have a longer duration than impulsive taps, as shown in Fig. 1.
In practice, induced motion can be picked up by the Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs) embedded on most of
the commercial smartwatches. IMU sensors have been widely used in many mobile sensing scenarios, since they
are able to capture displacement and rotation of the devices in 3-D space, and become increasingly cheap and
power e￿cient. Concretely in this work we consider both accelerometers and gyroscopes, which capture the
linear acceleration and angular velocity (roll, pitch and yaw) with respect to the three axis. By default the IMU
sensors on most smartwatches are set to be always-on, continuously sensing motion for various applications such
as gesture recognition, localisation, and ￿tness monitoring.￿is can lead to involuntary information leakage,
which may be leveraged by malicious parties to infer private and valuable data such as passwords.
3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
3.1 A￿ack Assumptions
We assume that the user installs Snoopy, a Trojan app that can be easily disguised as a ￿tness or gaming app [21].
Snoopy requires access to the motion sensors, which does not require explicit permission in Android or via
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Fig. 3. System overview:The a￿acker builds a deep RNN classifier using crowd-sourced data. On a victim’s smartwatch, a
trojan app uses an adaptive sampling scheme to record and identify a victim’s motion data. Candidate password sequences
are uploaded to the server. The back-end server runs the trained deep RNN classifier to infer possible passwords. Note,
training is only required by the a￿acker; no training is needed by the victim.
CMMotionManager in iOS. Snoopy logs and periodically sends candidate extracted password events via the
network. In Android this is given by the INTERNET permission which is classed as a normal permission, not
a dangerous permission. In iOS, this is done via a normal system API and thus no additional permissions are
required.￿e amount of data that needs to be sent is also small - a 10s batch of candidate password data is only
3 kByte, so Snoopy is unlikely to trigger any network level monitors. Note that throughout the a￿ack, Snoopy
only needs to eavesdrop motion data, without having access to any other sensing modality, such as monitoring
the touch screen [32, 43].
3.2 A￿ack Goals
￿ere are two key goals of the a￿ack. ￿e ￿rst is to successfully harvest candidate password events for later
extraction. ￿is is because sending raw motion data without segmentation will cause heavy tra￿c loads and
lead to the app more likely being ￿agged.￿e second is to be able to infer both tapped PINs and swiped APLs.
Once comprised, an a￿acker can unlock the physical device, accessing all stored information. Alternatively as
we observe in our user study (Sec. 7), many users would use the same passwords across di￿erent accounts and
platforms, where compromising one password can be harmful to many services.
3.3 System Architecture
In this section we present the high-level architecture of Snoopy, a system for inferring PINs and APLs on
smartwatches. Snoopy contains a client front-end which runs locally on a victim’s smartwatch which periodically
sends motion data to a password inference back-end that resides on the cloud. Fig.3 shows the the architecture of
the proposed system.
Front-end Password Input Extraction: ￿e front-end of Snoopy disguises itself as a harmless app, such as
￿tness app, and runs in the background continuously once installed. It listens to the IMU sensors and tries to
detect when users are tapping or swiping passwords on their watches. To avoid being ￿agged as malicious by
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the host OS, the front-end of Snoopy uses an adaptive motion sensing strategy. It continuously samples the
accelerometers at low rates to detect potential password input events.￿is conserves power, as accelerometers
are typically one to two orders of magnitude more power e￿cient than gyroscopes. Once a candidate event has
been detected, it enables the gyroscope and increases the sampling rate of both sensors, logging motion data until
the user ￿nishes entering passwords.￿en the segment of data is smoothed and passed through a lightweight
classi￿er, to determine retrospectively if it corresponds to a true password input event, or other user interactions
such as swiping down to check noti￿cations. In the la￿er case the data segment is simply discarded, while the
data of true password input events is transmi￿ed to the back-end for further analysis.
Back-end Password Inference: Given extracted segments of motion data, the back-end of Snoopy aims to infer
user entered passwords. Instead of relying on bespoke signal processing algorithms which require hand-cra￿ed
features and tuning, Snoopy considers an end-to-end deep learning approach, which takes the raw motion data
as the input, and computes the most likely password that the users has entered. To achieve this, Snoopy extends
standard deep Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) to capture the unique characteristics of device motion induced
by tapped PINs and swiped APLs. For PINs, it uses a hierarchical RNN with two layers to ￿lter out the motion
gaps (i.e. when the user li￿s her ￿nger o￿ the touchscreen in between two taps) before inference, while for APLs
it considers a bidirectional RNN to model the long continuous motion caused by swiping pa￿erns. Now we are in
a position to present the proposed Snoopy system in more detail.
4 IN SITU PASSWORD EXTRACTION
From a high level point of view, Snoopy infers the users’ passwords by collecting and analyzing the motion data
generated on their smartwatches. Of course one can task the motion sensors continuously at high sampling rates,
and stream the sensor data to the cloud for password inference. However in practice, this will incur signi￿cant
cost in energy, computation and communication, where the smartwatch operating systems (Android Wear or
WatchOS) can easily detect such unusual behaviour and kill Snoopy instantly. To make our a￿ack realistic, we
would like Snoopy to be as “benign” as possible, i.e. it should not ask for excessive ba￿ery or bandwidth use
most of time, but only become active (processing/transmi￿ing) when the users are actually inpu￿ing passwords.
In Secs. 4.1 and 4.2, we ￿rst explain how to adaptively task the motion sensors to detect potential password
input events without incurring heavy load on the system.￿en, in Sec. 4.3 we discuss how to extract the precise
segments of motion data corresponding to those detected candidate events, and identify if the segments are
related to actual password input events.
4.1 Adaptive Motion Sensing
Snoopy uses the onboard accelerometers to detect potential password input events, since they are very power
e￿cient compared with gyroscopes [41]. Concretely, we consider an adaptive sensing strategy, which switches
between three modes: passive listening, password input monitoring, and motion data extraction, depending on
di￿erent user behaviour. Most of the time Snoopy stays in the passive listening mode, where it only samples
accelerometer data at low rates and runs a gesture detection algorithm. Note that in this mode, Snoopy won’t
necessarily incur extra load on the sensors, since in practice major smartwatch platforms have their own gesture
recognition or ￿tness services running in the background, which already task the accelerometer continuously.
When it detects a user’s intention to interact with their device, via detection of a characteristic wrist movement,
Snoopy transitions into the password input monitoring mode, where it increases the accelerometer sampling rate
to look for potential password input events. It keeps analysing the received acceleration data, seeking to detect
when the user will start entering their password. Once such an event is detected, Snoopy immediately turns into
the motion data extraction mode, and samples both accelerometer and gyroscope at higher rates until it detects
that the user has ￿nished typing/swiping passwords.￿is segment of motion data is cached locally and passed
through a classi￿er which decides if it corresponds to normal tapping/swiping, e.g. check email noti￿cations, or
PACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: May 2017.
Snoopy: Sni￿ing Your Smartwatch Passwords via Deep Sequence Learning • 0:7
a true password input event. In the la￿er case, the cached data is sent to the cloud for password inference. At
the end of this process, Snoopy goes back to passive listening. In this way, Snoopy only actively processes and
transmits short bursts of password related motion data, and avoids unnecessarily alerting the OS or malware
monitoring frameworks.
4.2 Password Input Event Detection
As discussed above, when the users try to interact with their watches, Snoopy increases the accelerometer
sampling rate and starts to check if any password is entered. Given the raw acceleration stream, Snoopy uses a
sliding window of lengthT and stride S (both expressed in terms of samples) to segment the data into frames. Each
frame contains T data points and the overlap between adjacent frames is T   S (assuming T   S). In practice, the
optimalT and S depend on the accelerometer sampling rate and can be learned from the data. For instance in our
experiments, when the accelerometer rate is set to 40 Hz, the bestT and S are 60 and 6 measurements respectively.
￿en for each frame, we would like to decide whether the user starts to input passwords within that frame. To
achieve this, we ￿rst extract various features of the data frame, e.g. moments, maximum/minimum, skewness,
kurtosis of individual acceleration axis, and di￿erent norms (e.g. l1, l2, In￿nity and Frobenius norms) across all
three axes. In the current Snoopy implementation we consider 41 features in total. Based on the extracted feature
vector, we consider a Support Vector Machine (SVM) to label if the current frame belongs to a password input
event. If so, Snoopy switches to the motion data extraction mode, which samples both the accelerometer and
gyroscope at a high rate (e.g. 200Hz) and caches the data locally.￿is continues until it observes a sequence of
consecutive frames that are not labelled as password input. In this way, Snoopy tends to save the motion data of
as many potential password input events as possible. In what follows, we show how to extract the true password
input event through sequence alignment and classi￿cation.
4.3 Frame Smoothing and Password-positive Sequence Identification
Given a cached sequence of data frames, which correspond to a potential password input event, Snoopy needs to
decide: a) the accurate starting and ending frames of this event, and b) if this candidate event is a true password
input event or not. For the former task, we use a smoother to align the sequence of frames based on labels of
nearby frames.￿e intuition is that labels of adjacent frames should be consistent, i.e. a chunk of frames should
either belong to a password input event or not, but not have many interleaving labels. In Snoopy we consider two
types of smoothers, one based on a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to exploit the temporal correlations, and the
other based on moving average (essentially majority voting). From the output of the smoother, Snoopy extracts
the longest segment of frames whose labels are positive. If the segment length exceeds a minimum threshold,
Snoopy considers this segment of motion data to be able to cover the potential password input event precisely.
In Sec. 6 we will show why this smoothing process is crucial, and how the two smoothers perform in di￿erent
se￿ings. However in practice, the motion data extracted might not always correspond to password input; for
instance, it could correspond to users tapping or swiping their smartwatches to preview email, or check upcoming
calendar noti￿cations.￿erefore, given the extracted motion data, we need to identify whether it is corresponding
to a true password input event, or not. Snoopy addresses this by post-hoc feeding the extracted data segment
into a binary classi￿er, which is trained on a pre-collected motion dataset covering various user interactions.
In our experiments, we ￿nd that this classi￿cation step can be e￿ciently run on the smartwatches in real-time.
￿erefore, Snoopy is able to locally identify and extract the precise segments of motion data corresponding
to password input events, and only send such data to the cloud for further password inference, which will be
discussed in the next section.
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Fig. 4. Comparison of seq2pwd and seq2dgt models in Snoopy. Both models are able to a￿ack users outside the training
cohorts. In terms of password coverage, seq2pwd model can infer passwords seen before, while seq2dgt model is able to infer
any password including those not encountered before.
5 DEEPLY LEARNED PASSWORD INFERENCE
As discussed in the previous section, the front-end of Snoopy runs locally on the users’ smartwatches in the
background, and eavesdrops the motion data (i.e. acceleration and gyroscope data) when users type or swipe
their passwords.￿e extracted data segments corresponding to those passwords are transmi￿ed to the cloud,
where the back-end of the Snoopy system tries to infer the contents of the passwords. Snoopy has two inference
models: sequence2password (seq2pwd) and sequence2digits (seq2dgt). Both models adopt a novel deep learning
based password inference approach, which does not rely on accurate keystroke segmentation or handcra￿ed
features, and is able to infer passwords reliably across di￿erent users and devices. In the following, Sec. 5.1 ￿rst
explains how we cast the problem of password inference into a classi￿cation problem. For interested readers, the
background on recurrent neural networks and their use for sequence modeling is given in the appendix. Secs. 5.2
and 5.3 describe the design of two novel deep RNN models to infer the passwords from the captured motion data.
5.1 Password Inference via Classification
We consider the task of password inference as a classi￿cation problem, where the category labels are a set of
passwords P , i.e. four digits PINs or APLs on 3⇥3 grid.￿en given the segment of motion data, the problem of
inferring the password that the user has just input becomes that of ￿nding a label within the database P , which
can best explain the observed motion data.￿e size of the database P determines the inference model.￿ough
the universe of all APLs and PINs is very large, the distribution of the adoption of them in real-world is skewed.
For instance, according to statistical studies [22, 38], certain APLs tend to be more popular than others, and
people only use a small set of passwords due to their bias.￿is means that one can utilize the skewed distribution
and develop their database P targeting at the most commonly used passwords, which is more e￿cient and more
cost-e￿ective.￿e seq2pwd model in Snoopy is designed in this context. As in [5], by taking inputs as the motion
data, the proposed seq2pwd model classi￿es a sequence to the mostly likely passwords in P , without any digit
segmentation.
However, despite the high likelihood of a password existing in the most commonly used password database, the
expressive power of password inference is somewhat limited as seq2pwd loses its e￿ectiveness when encountering
unseen passwords (< P ). And this problem gets serious when it comes to PIN inference, as the statistics of the
most commonly used PINs are not as strong as the one of APLs. To solve this problem, a seq2dgt model is also
proposed in Snoopy that takes inputs as motion data but predicts the password digit-by-digit.￿at is to say, we
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Fig. 5. The architectures of two inference models in Snoopy. Le￿: seq2pwd Model for commonly used password inference.
Right: seq2dgt model for universal password inference.
could train a model by a subset of the password universe but the learnt model is able to infer any member in the
universe, as long as the constituted digits are seen by the model. Fortunately, there are only 10 possibilities of the
digits in APLs or PINs, which is easy to meet.￿erefore, the seq2dgt is essentially a digit classi￿er that outputs
multiple predictions at each time, where the length of predictions is decided by the password length. Notably,
unlike existing work, the proposed seq2dgt model does not rely on pre-processed keystroke segmentation [28]
and known password lengths [5]. It automatically learns to align the chunks of motion data to the corresponding
digits and learns to predict digits without knowing in advance how many there are.￿is is particularly useful in
the case of APLs, where keystroke segmentation is not applicable [5], as the motion data of swiping APLs gives
li￿le information for digit segmentation (Fig. 1).
In the rest of this section, we introduce the seq2pwd model designed for APL inference as the distribution of
popular adopted PINs is not as centered as that of APLs (see the survey in Sec.6).￿e seq2dgt model is proposed
for both APL and PIN inference to cover the whole universe. Fig. 4 illustrates the inference coverage of the two
models.
5.2 Sequence-to-Password (seq2pwd) Model for Most Commonly Used Password Inference
Swiping passwords on the touchscreen of smartwatches, the user’s ￿nger drags the device to shi￿ around slightly,
creating slip-pulse waves in the acceleration and gyroscope data (as shown in Fig. 1). ￿is means the motion
signals induced by swiping are more continuous than those of tapping, and typically without any gaps in between.
￿erefore, in this case the keystroke based inference approaches [29, 42] won’t work well since it is impossible to
segment the motion data without clear boundaries between di￿erent keystrokes.
On the other hand, for APLs the temporal correlations within the swiped pa￿ern are much stronger, which
can signi￿cantly reduce the search space and help the inference process. As discussed in Sec.2, given the current
￿nger position, the smartwatch OS poses certain constraints on the possible directions of swipe [38], it is only
possible to swipe towards three to four reachable neighbours when starting from the top le￿ dot. Note that
although the standard RNNs with LSTMs are able to capture these correlations to a certain extent, they have
certain limitations.￿e most important is that the network only generates output from the last hidden state (i.e.
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hT). Standard problems solved by LSTMs in NLP are with the input sequences of at most 100 samples. However,
the input sequence of APLs tends to be longer, and it is more di￿cult for the information encoded at the beginning
of the input sequence to propagate through and impact the inference results.
To address this, Snoopy proposes a Bidirectional RNN (B-RNN) to model the rich temporal correlations within
the input motion data. Concretely, at each timestamp k the proposed B-RNN keeps two hidden states  h k and  !h k ,
which incorporate the future (k + 1, …, T ) and past (1, …, k   1) information in the input sequence respectively,
as shown in Fig. 5 (Le￿).￿en B-RNN uses the same machinery as in Eqn. 7 to update those states from both
directions. Unlike the standard network, it has two output nodes: one  !hT at the end and the other  h 1 at the
beginning.￿erefore in B-RNN, information ￿ows from both the start and the end of the input sequence, and the
output of the network is generated from the concatenation of the two output variables  !hT and  h 1. As shown
in the next section, by using the bidirectional network architecture, Snoopy is able to preserve the long-term
dependencies in the motion signals caused by swiping passwords, and thus infers passwords at much higher
accuracy compared to competing approaches.
5.3 Sequence-to-Digits (seq2dgt) Model for Universal Password Inference
By formulating password inference as a sequence labeling problem, seq2pwd based RNN can guess password
with a very high accuracy. However, it is di￿cult to adapt the seq2pwd framework to infer universal passwords.
For instance, there are 389,112 possibilities for APLs and 10,000 for PINs. Using this large amount of labels for
training classi￿ers requires huge amount of samples which is intractable in practice. We therefore propose the
seq2dgt model to transform a sequence classi￿cation problem to a series of digit classi￿cation problems, where
the current predicted digit conditions on the last prediction.
Despite their ￿exibility and power, standard RNNs can only be applied to problems whose inputs and targets
share the same dimensions. It is a signi￿cant limitation in our context for two reasons. First, the lengths of APLs
vary from 4 to 9, which implies the classi￿er needs to predict the length of digits implicitly. Fig. 6 (right) shows
the duration distribution of 4 digit APLs and 7-digit APLs. As we can see, though there are 3 digits di￿erence, the
overlap of their distributions is above 40%. Second, an input IMU readings can be as long as several hundred
samples, while the readings corresponding to a certain digit are only centered in a chunk of samples. Even if the
number of digits is given, associating chunks to digits is di￿cult, as entering PINs or APLs on smartwatches does
not necessarily occur with a uniform motion (see Fig. 1).
To solve the ￿rst problem, we resort to the encoder-decoder RNN architecture. It ￿rstly uses an RNN as the
encoder to map an input sequence to a context vector c, and then stacks another RNN on it to decode the target
sequence from the context vector.￿e decoder is o￿en trained to predict the next sample  k 0 , given the previous
prediction { 1, . . . , k 0 1}. Formally, the probability of output sequence Y with the length of T 0 (a few number of
digits in our context) is de￿ned as:
p (Y) =
T 0X
k 0=1
p ( k 0 |{ 1, 2, · · · , k 0 1},X) (1)
With the decoder RNN, each condition probability is modeled as:
p ( k 0 |{ 1, 2, · · · , k 0 1},X) =  ( k 0 1, sk 0, c) (2)
where k denotes a timestep in inputs (1 < k < T ) and k 0 is a timestep in outputs (1 < k 0 < T 0).   is a nonlinear,
potentially multi-layered function that outputs the probability of  k 0 ; sk 0 is the hidden state of the decoder RNN
and c is the encoded context vector. Fig. 10 (Right) illustrate the above RNN architecture used in our seq2dgt
model.
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Fig. 6. PDF of APL input duration. Le￿: duration distribution of swiping APLs. Right: Di￿erentiating a 4-digit APL and
7-digit APL is di￿icult based on their duration distribution.
By introducing a dummy digit symbol < EOS >, standing for end of output sequences, the unknown lengths
of APLs can be implicitly determined. In this way, we have 10 candidate ‘digits’ for each digit in APLs that our
model needs to predict, i.e., {1, 2, . . . , 9, < EOS >}.￿e digit length of an APL is decided when the seq2dgt models
gives the ￿rst < EOS > symbol. For instances, a prediction 01, 2, 3, 6, < EOS >, 9, < EOS >0 indicates the length
of target APL is 4. All predicted digits a￿er the ￿rst < EOS > symbol e.g., 090, < EOS > in the example, are not
counted. < EOS > usage is widely adopted in the ￿eld of NLP [34]. An analogous instance of ours is machine
translation, where a source English sentence may not have the same number of words as its Chinese translation.
￿e dummy < EOS > symbol can prevent the model generating an in￿nite number of words. Note that, this step
is only for APLs; a PIN’s length is ￿xed to 4 in most scenarios.
Originally, the context vector c is computed by encoding all inputs. However, the second problem remains as
the IMU readings are sampled at 200Hz, whose lengths are dramatically longer than a few digits but only a part
of them contribute at one decoding timestep. Here we introduce the a￿ention mechanism in our seq2dgt model.
Formally, the conditional probability in this a￿ention seq2dgt is de￿ned as:
p ( k 0 |{ 1, 2, · · · , k 0 1},X) =  ( k 0 1, sk 0, ck 0 ) (3)
Unlike the conditional probability in Eq. (2), here the probability is conditioned on a distinct context vector ck 0
for each output digit  k 0 .￿e new context vector depends on a sequence of hidden sates (h1, . . . ,hT ) to which an
encoder maps the input sequence X, where we adopt a bidirectional RNN, i.e., hk = [
  
h k ,
 !
h k ]. Formally,
ck 0 =
TX
k=1
ak 0khk (4)
where ak 0k are the weights determing the contribution of hk in encoding ck 0 for the k 0-th digit and it can be
determined through backpropagation in an end-to-end optimization.￿e a￿ention mechanism is widely adopted
in the scenario where input sequences are very long, and a single context vector is too compressed to decode
outputs. For example, Hermann et al. [13] have achieved impressive results in document summarization by
introducing the a￿ention mechanism in their models, which solves the problem that the number of words of in
the input documents are much larger than the ones in the output summaries. As shown in the next section, the
seq2dgt model bene￿ts from this a￿ention mechanism and it is able to adaptively focus on speci￿c chunks of
input (with high a￿ention weights) when generating digits in di￿erent positions of the passwords.
6 EVALUATION
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We evaluate the proposed Snoopy system extensively on large-scale real world datasets collected in three di￿erent
sites: Oxford, Shanghai and Harbin. In total, our experiments collected preferred/generated passwords from 420
anonymous participants, recruited a separate group of 362 volunteers to contribute their motion data when
entering passwords on smartwatches (worn on their le￿ hands), and accumulated over 60k samples of motion
data during password entries1. In the following, Sec. 6.1 focuses on evaluating the performance of the front-end
password extraction capability of the proposed Snoopy system; Sec. 6.2 presents the performance of Snoopy in
inferring APLs; and ￿nally Sec. 6.3 assesses our system’s capability of PIN inference.
6.1 Performance of Password Input Extraction
6.1.1 Experimental Setup.
Data Collection: To evaluate the performance of password input extraction, we recruited 15 volunteers (10
males and 5 females), and asked them to wear di￿erent smartwatches (Android and iWatches) on their le￿ wrists.
￿roughout our experiments we use four di￿erent models of Android watches: Sony SmartWatch3, Samsung
Gear Live, Moto 360 Sports, LG Urbane, and two Apple watches: 38mm and 42mm versions of iWatch2. Note that
Android smart watches typically use APLs for system level authentication, whereas Apple watches use PINs.
During the experiments, we asked the participants to perform three di￿erent types of actions: password input
where they enter their passwords on their smartwatches; non-password input where they tap/swipe on the
watches screen to do other tasks (e.g. preview email or check a calendar noti￿cation) but not to enter a password;
and no input when they just perform a series of activities wearing their smartwatches, such as drinking, drawing,
eating, walking, going down/upstairs, typing on keyboards and holding hands still. We designed a data collection
app on the smartwatches, which samples the motion sensors in the background (100Hz in this case), and instructs
the participants to perform certain actions at a given time. In this way we can obtain accurate ground truth as to
when the user is performing a certain action.
To collect rich enough data, in one episode we requested a participant to at least perform three actions, where
the action in the middle should be password input or non-password input action, e.g. she may ￿rst walk, then
enter her password, and ￿nally go upstairs. Each participant is requested to contribute multiple episodes, and in
total we obtained 455 episodes for Android watches, and 387 for Apple watches.
Competing Approaches: Since the front-end of Snoopy has to run locally, in this series of experiments we only
consider lightweight approaches that can run in real-time on the smartwatches. Recall that the task of password
extraction has not been a￿empted on smartwatches before. Previous related work has focused on the extraction
of PINs on smartphones only [8, 28, 42]. However, features used to extract keystrokes on smartphones are not
suitable for smartwatches due to the limited screen size and low signal to noise ratio (see Fig. 2). And even in the
case of smartphones, previous work has assumed that any keystroke is part of a password; however in practice,
keystrokes could be used in the middle of other tasks not related to password input, for example replying to email.
￿ere is no competing approach that currently addresses the entire password extraction task. In what follows,
we evaluate a realistic password extraction approach for smartwatches that has three stages. In the ￿rst stage, we
assess how well we can detect the beginning of a password (see Sec. 4.2 for details); we compare a number of
classi￿ers including the Support Vector Classi￿er (SVC), decision trees, logistic regression, naive Bayesian
and random forest classi￿ers. Once we have detected the beginning of a password, in the second stage, we
continue to de￿ne the full extent of the potential password, by classifying individual frames, and smoothing
classi￿cation results (see Sec. 4.3 for details). Here for smoothing, we compare the Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
based and the voting based moving average (moving average) approaches implemented in Snoopy with the
baseline approach without smoothing (raw). Once the start and end of a potential password are found, the ￿nal
stage classi￿es this sequence as an actual password, or a non-password sequence (as discussed at the end of
1￿e study has received ethical approval R50768 from the University of Oxford.
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Fig. 7. Performance of detecting potential password input events. Le￿: PINs; Right: APLs
Sec. 4.3); here we also compare the performance of several classi￿ers, including SVC, decision trees, logistic
regression, naive Bayesian and random forest.￿e collected dataset is split into a training set (data from 10
subjects) and a test set (data from the other 5 subjects), and we consider 5-fold cross-validation.
6.1.2 Experiment Results.
Detecting Password Input Events: As discussed in Sec. 4.2, for a given frame of acceleration data, we would
like to decide whether it corresponds to password input or not. As in many other binary classi￿cation problems,
here we consider the precision, recall, F1 score and accuracy of the classi￿ers. Fig. 7 shows that the SVC
outperforms competing classi￿ers in terms of all evaluation metrics. For both PINs and APLs, it can achieve
> 0.95 F1 scores and > 0.98 accuracy.￿e random forest and decision tree classi￿ers can achieve comparable
recall with SVC, but their precision is nearly 8% lower than that of SVC. Based on these results, in what follows,
we adopt SVC as the default classi￿er for detecting the beginning of a potential password input event in Snoopy.
Smoothing Detected Sequences: ￿e above SVC approach is iteratively used in ensuing frames to classify
them as password-related (‘1’) or not (‘0’). When we start seeing a lot of ‘0’-s this indicates the end of a potential
password.￿e candidate password sequence that we derive (e.g. ‘11001111110001101’) is then passed through a
smoothing process as discussed in Sec.4.3.￿e smoother adjusts the frame labels taking into account those of
nearby frames, and further re￿nes the start and end point of the potential password input event. To evaluate the
performance of the smoothing process, we consider the similarity of a frame sequence sr with respect to the
ground truth st :
d (sr , st ) =
|sr \ st |
( |sr | + |st |)/2 (5)
where | · | is the cardinality of the positive labels, and |sr \ st | is the number of frames that have the same labels
in both sr and st . Intuitively a sequence sr with higher d is be￿er because it is closer to the ground truth, and
thus tends to contain larger portion of correctly labelled frames. Fig. 8 shows the average similarity scores of
sequences generated by di￿erent smoothers (HMM and majority voting moving average vs. no smoothing). As
we can see for di￿erent frame sizes, sequences without smoothing (raw) consistently have lower d scores.￿is
con￿rms that the smoothing process is bene￿cial. For instance, for APLs, the moving average smoother can reach
0.98 in terms of sequence similarity score, while for PINs the HMM smoother can achieve 0.94. Note that for the
PINs, the performance gain between not using (raw) and using smoothers (HMM and moving average) can be up
to 35%.￿is is because the motion data generated by PINs contains “gaps” between two adjacent ￿nger touches,
where the detection approaches would naturally label frames within the gaps as negative (i.e. no password input).
In those cases, the smoothers can correct those errors, and output a sequence with more consistent labels. It is
also interesting to see that although the two smoothers considered in Snoopy have comparable performance,
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Fig. 8. Performance of sequence smoothing when using di￿erent frame sizes. Le￿: PINs; Right: APLs
F1
Score Precision Recall
Decision
Tree 0.89 0.92 0.86
Naive
Bayesian 0.91 0.90 0.91
Logistic
Regression 0.95 0.96 0.93
SVC 0.93 0.92 0.95
Table 1. PIN sequence identification results.
F1
Score Precision Recall
Decision
Tree 0.93 0.91 0.93
Naive
Bayesian 0.91 0.90 0.91
Logistic
Regression 0.96 0.97 0.95
SVC 0.94 0.95 0.94
Table 2. APL sequence identification results.
ave./max
(%)
Feature
Extraction SVM
Sony
SW3 8.9/23.0 7.2/21.4
Samsung
Gear Live 10.9/25.2 9.8/18.5
Moto 360
Sports 10.5/22.7 10.1/25.5
Table 3. CPU load of running
feature extraction and SVM.
HMM tends to work be￿er than moving average for PINs, but can be inferior for APLs. Again this is because
HMM is able to mitigate those non-informative gaps within data of the PINs, while for APLs moving average is
more robust.
Password-positive vs. Password-negative Sequences: Given a smoothed sequence, the front-end of Snoopy
needs to identify if it corresponds to an actual password input, or non-password input such as swiping to check
noti￿cations. As discussed in Sec.4.3, Snoopy addresses this by feeding an entire sequence into a binary classi￿er.
Tables 1 and 2 show the identi￿cation performance of di￿erent classi￿ers for PINs and APLs respectively. We see
that unlike the more expensive random forest and SVC, the simpler classi￿ers work surprisingly well for this
task. Note that for both types of passwords, the simple classi￿ers can achieve up to >0.95 F1 score, which means
they are able to reliably distinguish motion caused by password input from that of other interactions. ￿is is
because due to the small size of the smartwatches, the ways to interact with their touchscreens are very limited.
￿erefore the motion signals of PINs or APLs are very unique compared to others.
Resource Consumption: ￿e ￿nal set of experiments analyse the resource consumption of Snoopy front-end
on three Android watches with di￿erent hardware speci￿cations. Tab. 4 shows the average/maximum CPU
load, delta current consumption and ba￿ery usages when the front-end is running the following three tasks:
a) password input detection (Sec. 4.2); b) password-input data smoothing and identi￿cation (Sec. 4.3); and c)
uploading extracted data to the back-end. We see that among the three tasks, uploading actually consumes the
largest amount of energy, while detection and smoothing are relatively cheap. On the other hand, detection
and smoothing tend to occupy the CPU more than uploading. ￿is is expected because it is well known
that transmi￿ing over WiFi is power-consuming on smartwatches, while detection and smoothing are more
computation-intensive as they involve running SVM classi￿ers. More speci￿cally, as shown in Tab. 3, on all three
watch platforms, running feature extraction and SVM classi￿ers consume similar level of CPU resources (⇠10%),
but the former is slightly more expensive since it involves continuous caching operations, e.g. maintaining the
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sliding windows. In addition, like many other apps [20], to minimize impact on ba￿ery lifetime, Snoopy only
uploads cached data when the watches are connected to power with WiFi connections available. As shown in
Tab. 4, in general the Snoopy front-end doesn’t require excessive resources, and when disguised as an innocent
￿tness app, it is not likely to have noticeably abnormal energy/computation impact on the smartwatches.
Model SoC RAM BatteryCap. Task CPU load (avg/max) Current delta
Battery
Usage
Sony SW3
￿alcomm
APQ8026
SD 400
512MB 420 mAh
Detection 9.2%/17.5% 8.9 mA
2% per hrSmoothing 7.2%/15.2% 3.1 mA
Uploading 2.4%/9.9% 18.9 mA
Samsung
Gear Live
￿alcomm
MSM8226
SD 400
512MB 300 mAh
Detection 8.1%/19.4% 11.4 mA
3% per hrSmoothing 15.6%/29.3% 6.2 mA
Uploading 2.1%/19.3% 25.1 mA
Moto 360
Sports
￿alcomm
MSM8926
SD 400
512MB 300 mAh
Detection 8.3%/26.2% 16.1 mA
3% per hrSmoothing 7.3%/22.4% 3.8 mA
Uploading 2.3%/26.1% 22.3 mA
Table 4. Resource consumption (CPU and power) of the Snoopy front-end on smartwatches with di￿erent hardware specs.
6.2 Performance of APL Inference
We are now in a position to turn our a￿ention to how the back-end password inference component of Snoopy
performs. In this section we ￿rstly discuss the performance of APL inference, while the PIN inference will be
covered in Sec. 6.3.
6.2.1 Experiment Setup.
APL Database Construction: As discussed in Sec. 5, to infer the user entered APLs, both the seq2pwd and
seq2dgt models considered in Snoopy require a good password database P for training, which can cover as
many common passwords as possible. To construct such a database P , we consider the publicly available APL
data reported in [22] and also collected our own dataset.￿e APL dataset in [22] contains ⇠4, 000 APLs entries
collected from the anonymous users (with duplications). From this dataset, we rank the distinct APLs according
to their frequencies, and select the most popular 113 APLs that can cover half of all the APL entries (2000 out of
4000).￿is ensures that the selected APLs can achieve a good coverage of the most commonly used APLs, while
leaving out those APLs that are seldom used.
We also recruited 112 anonymous participants to survey their preferred passwords (both PIN and APL) when
using mobile devices.￿e purpose of collecting our own password dataset is to obtain an independent dataset in
addition to the publicly available data, which would make the constructed password database P more diverse.
During the data collection process, we have made sure that every step complied with data privacy policies, and
there is no link between the collected data and any individual participant. In particular, we have ￿rst obtained
the participants’ consent that their data will be used in a scienti￿c study to evaluate password security on
smartwatches. If a participant agreed to proceed, she was then given an Android watch, and we asked her to
wear the watch on her le￿ wrist. ￿en the participant is provided with an instruction sheet, which asks her
to set a password in a survey app on the smartwatch. ￿e survey app only records the entered passwords by
monitoring touches on the touchscreen. When the participant ￿nished entering the password, it asks if she is
aware of the purpose of the study and would like to contribute this password. If so, the password is assigned
with a unique random ID, and wri￿en into a random line of a local text ￿le on the smartwatch. Otherwise there
is no information saved. Note that during this process, the participants were asked to input passwords in private
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Fig. 10. Impact of network architectures on the inference
accuracy.
and take their time.￿e watches and instruction sheet were passed directly to the next participant without our
intervention. A￿er the survey process, fortunately we obtained 112 APL entries from all participants, among
which we have extracted 64 distinct APLs. Finally, we fuse those 64 surveyed APLs and the 113 APLs extract
from the existing dataset [22], and construct a password database P with 147 distinct APLs.
APL InputMotion Data Collection: Given the above constructed APL database P , we recruited a total number
of 322 participants across three experiment sites to collect the motion data when they are entering APLs on their
smartwatches. Each participant was randomly given 6 APLs selected from P .￿e participants were asked to wear
the smartwaches on their le￿ wrist but in the most comfortable way, and then enter each password in our data
collection app about 20 times.￿e app logs the ground truth by monitoring tap/swipe on the smartwatch screen,
and saves the motion data at the same time. In total, we have collected 36, 569 valid samples, each of which
contains an APL and the motion data when it was entered.￿is set of data is used to train our models in Snoopy.
Competing Approaches: We implement both the seq2pwd and seq2dgt models considered in Snoopy using
Keras [9], and train them on NVIDIA K80 GPUs with the Adam optimiser [16]. To the best of our knowledge,
Snoopy is the ￿rst work to study the problem of inferring smartwatch APLs, and there is no existing work that
can infer APLs without knowing the exact segmentation of digits within APLs (as discussed in 5.3).￿erefore,
here we only consider one of the best APL inference approach designed for smartphones, GestureLogger [5],
which bears some resemblance to the proposed seq2pwd model in Snoopy.
6.2.2 Experiment Results.
Field Test APLs vs. Constructed APL Database: ￿e ￿rst experiment veri￿es the representativeness of the
constructed APL database. We recruited an independent cohort of 308 volunteers (115 female and 193 male,
mean age 39.8 with   = 11.3, Mdn = 40, ranging from 18 to 63), and made sure that none of them was involved
in building the APL database. ￿en we asked them to conduct an anonymous online survey to provide their
preferred APLs.￿is survey also complies with data privacy policies and there is no link between the collected
APLs and any individual participants. A￿er the survey process, we obtained 308 APL entries from all participants.
We found that among the 308 APL entries, 223 (72.4%) fall into the constructed APL database.￿is con￿rms that
the constructed P indeed covers a good variety of commonly used APLs, and it is possible to use P to accurately
infer the user entered APLs.
APL Inference Accuracy in Field Test: ￿is experiment evaluates the performance of APL inference of the
proposed Snoopy system in the ￿eld test. As discussed above, Snoopy uses the constructed password database P
and the associated motion data to train its models. To evaluate its true capability of inferring APLs in real-world
scenarios, we consider the ￿eld test APLs which are independent with the APL database P . Concretely, we
consider a similar approach as in [43], and recruited another 20 volunteers (13 males and 7 females), who hadn’t
contributed any password or motion data, to reproduce (i.e. input) the 308 APLs obtained from the ￿led test.￿e
PACM on Interactive, Mobile, Wearable and Ubiquitous Technologies, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 0. Publication date: May 2017.
Snoopy: Sni￿ing Your Smartwatch Passwords via Deep Sequence Learning • 0:17
motion data associated with APL entries was collected using the same watch app, and on average each volunteer
swiped about 120 APLs. Eventually we obtained 2, 368 valid samples using three di￿erent types of watches (Sony
SW3, Samsung Gear Live and Moto 360), and this data is the used to assess the accuracy of APL inference.
We consider the successful rate at di￿erent number of a￿empts [25, 38] as the metric inference accuracy, which
has been widely used to quantify the threat level of a malicious app [12]. As in GestureLogger [5], we set the
maximum possible number of a￿empts to 20.Both proposed and competing methods take as input a motion signal
sequence, and return scores for di￿erent candidate passwords. We then select the top 20 passwords, which are
the most likely passwords according to the technique used.￿e ￿rst guess always selects the top password, the
second guess the next most likely, and so on.
Fig. 9 shows inference accuracy of APLs, where we include random guess as the naive baseline. We see that
both of the proposed models (seq2pwd and seq2dgt) in Snoopy consistently outperform GestureLogger, achieving
up to 3-4 fold improvement in inference accuracy. In particular, if only allowed to guess once, seq2dgt model can
get 21% accuracy, i.e. one in ￿ve times it is able to guess the correct APL, while seq2pwd can achieve an even
higher accuracy of 39%. We found that although seq2pwd model can only predict APLs within the constructed
database P (|P | = 147), its inference accuracy is ‘worryingly’ good: if 10 guesses are allowed, its accuracy can
be 65% and increases up to to 68% for 20 guesses. Note that here the inference is performed on the ￿eld test
data which is completely independent from the data used to construct P .￿is means that the APL database P
constructed in our experiments is very representative, and thus in practice, it is possible to infer most of the
popular APLs with such a database P . In addition, although GestureLogger also infers APLs from P , its accuracy
is very limited and only able to reach 19% a￿er 20 a￿empts (more than 3 folds lower than seq2pwd).
On the other hand, seq2dgt is not limited to the size of database P , and can predict any APLs within all the
389, 112 possibilities. We see that although the search space now is ⇠ 2700 times bigger, seq2dgt can still achieve
decent inference accuracy: about 43% a￿er 10 a￿empts and up to 50% with 20 guesses.￿is indicates that the
proposed seq2dgt model can indeed learn the underlying mechanism of user entering APLs, and make informed
predictions when applicable. Note that although seq2dgt solves a much more challenging problem, i.e. no prior
knowledge on popular APLs or perfect segmentation between digits, its accuracy is still way superior than the
state-of-the-art GestureLogger: within 20 guesses, seq2dgt is 250% more likely to hit the correct password than
GestureLogger.
Impact of Network Architecture: ￿is experiment investigates the inference performance of Snoopy when
using di￿erent deep network architectures. For seq2pwd model, we compare the inference accuracy of the
proposed bi-directional RNN (B-RNN) and standard RNN. As shown in Fig. 10, B-RNN is about 15% superior to
standard RNN at the ￿rst a￿empt, and is ⇠ 8% more accurate on average within 20 a￿empts.￿is means that the
temporal correlations within APLs are di￿cult to be captured by standard RNNs, and by allowing gradient ￿ow
from both directions, B-RNN is able to capture richer information especially in long APL sequences. On the other
hand, for the seq2dgt model, we see that the proposed a￿ention mechanism can improve about 10% of inference
accuracy over the standard architecture.￿is is because the a￿ention mechanism helps the network to focus
more on the chunks of informative sensor readings, i.e. when ￿nger tips slide through digits, while the standard
network only decodes APLs based on ￿xed context vectors.
Inference Accuracy vs. Device Heterogeneity: In previous experiments, although we always consider
cross-user inference, i.e. our system is trained on data collected from one group of users, but tested against
data generated from the others, we assume that the same model of device are used in training and testing. For
instance, to infer passwords entered on a Sony SW3 watch, we assume that Snoopy can be trained with data
collected on Sony SW3 watches (not necessarily the same one). In this experiment, we further push the limit, and
see how Snoopy performs in the presence of device heterogeneity.￿is is very challenging, since the watches
used for testing may have di￿erent sensors, dimensions or shapes (round vs. square) with those used for training.
To demonstrate this, for APLs we train Snoopy with data from Sony SW3 watches, and test it on the other two
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Fig. 11. Cross-device APL inference accuracy. Le￿: seq2pwd model; Right: seq2dgt model.
models, Samsung Gear Live and Moto 360 Sports respectively. Fig. 11 shows the inference accuracy with the same
device model, and across di￿erence models. Note that here we put the performance of GestureLoger (trained and
tested on the same device model) as the baseline. As we can see, for seq2pwd, when tested on di￿erent devices,
its performance drops elegantly. For Moto 360 which has round shape (the Sony watches used for training are
square shaped), the performance only decreases by ⇠13% on average.￿is means heterogeneity in the shape of
smartwatches won’t a￿ect password inference performance signi￿cantly. On the other hand, the performance on
Samsung Gear Live (square shaped) drops about 20%. Note that even for this worst case, the inference accuracy
of seq2pwd can still reach ⇠50% a￿er 10 a￿empts, while the best competing approach GestureLoger is less
than 10%. On the other hand, from the right of Fig. 11, we see that seq2dgt model is slightly more sensitive to
device heterogeneity. On Moto watches the accuracy decreases ⇠ 18% while about 25% on the Samsung watches.
￿is is also expected since seq2dgt works against a massive search space (389, 112 possibilities), where a small
perturbation in sensor readings might lead to very di￿erent predictions. However even in this challenging case,
the inference accuracy is still consistently higher than that of GeastureLogger, which is trained and tested on the
same device models.
6.3 Performance of PIN Inference
In this section, we further evaluate the performance of the proposed Snoopy system in inferring PINs entered on
smartwatches.
6.3.1 Experiment Setup.
Training Data Collection: Like the previous APL case, we ￿rst constructed a PIN database by surveying the
same 112 anonymous participants. We follow the same data collection protocol as discussed in the previous
section, and obtained a database P containing 79 distinct PINs from the 112 responses. To collect the PIN input
motion data, we recruited a group of 156 users, and ask them to input 6 randomly selected PINs from P with
smartwatches (iWatches) worn on their le￿ wrists. We use a similar data collection app, and eventually collected
23, 144 valid samples of motion data associated with the PIN input events. As in the APL case, this data is used to
train the proposed Snoopy system.
Competing Approaches: To the best of our knowledge, there is no existing work studying PIN inference on
smartwatches.￿erefore, we compare Snoopy with the state-of-the-art PIN inference approaches designed for
smartphones.￿ese approaches usually adopt an element-wise inference: it ￿rstly identi￿es each digit of the
PINs and then concatenate the identi￿ed elements into whole passwords. We implemented three well-known
approaches: 1) Accessory [29]: which uses a random forest classi￿er to identify the individual tapped digits
from accelerator data; 2) TapLogger [42] which is very similar to Accessory but uses k NN classi￿er; and 3)
TapPrints [28], which considers both acceleration and gyroscope data, and uses an ensemble classi￿er (SVC,
decision tree, logistic regression and random forests as base learners) to detect PIN elements. Details of the
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Fig. 12. Performance of PIN inference. Le￿: element-wise accuracy of existing approaches; Right: inference accuracy of
Snoopy and competing approaches.
competing approaches can be found in Tab. 6. Note that all of the three competing approaches require prior
knowledge on the accurate segmentation of motion data, while Snoopy is able to perform end-to-end inference.
6.3.2 Experiment Results.
Field Test PINs vs. Constructed PIN Database: ￿e ￿rst experiment is to evaluate to what extend can the
constructed PIN database cover the commonly used PINs in the real world. We obtain from [3] a large online
surveyed PIN dataset containing 204, 508 PINs, and consider it as the ￿eld test PIN data. As in the APL case,
we rank those PINs according to their frequencies, and then select the top 642 distinct most popular PINs to
cover half of all the PIN entries (> 100k). For those 642 distinct PINs, we compare them with those in our PIN
database P . We found that unlike the APL case where we observe a signi￿cant overlapping between the ￿eld test
passwords and the constructed password database, here the overlapping is only about 7%. Unfortunately to the
best of our knowledge there is no study so far that can provide thorough explanation on this. Our intuition is
that people o￿en use meaningful numbers to themselves as PINs, such as birthdays or addresses, which are quite
unlikely to collide. In addition, clearly there is less constraints when tapping digits on touch screen than that of
swiping APLs, and thus people may tend to choose from those easy-to-swipe APLs. Based on this observation, in
the following we only consider seq2dgt for PIN inference but not seq2pwd, since the la￿er can only predict PINs
from the database P which only covers a small percentage of commonly used PINs.
Element-wise Inference Accuracy: Before evaluating Snoopy, in this experiment, we ￿rst evaluate the
performance of the existing element-wise inference approaches. We consider two types of password inference.
Firstly, the same-user inference assumes that the algorithms would infer passwords entered by a user with access
to the ground truth password-input motion data of this particular user, e.g. they have previously “seen” the user
entering passwords (i.e. knowing the password contents), and collected the corresponding motion data. On the
other hand, the same-user inference assumes the algorithms have to infer a user’s passwords without access to her
previous labelled motion data. As shown in Fig. 12 (Le￿), the performance of element-wise approaches is very
limited: the best algorithm can only achieve about 25% accuracy when inferring a single digit for a PIN (one time
guess), while the accuracy of random guess is 1/10. Even in the most favorable case where the testing objects
are the same users in training, the performance only grows ⇠ 10%. A possible reason for the low segmentation
accuracy is that the SNR of the motion data on smartwatches is much lower than that of smartphones, which
limits the performance of prior art designed for smartphones signi￿cantly. Overall TapPrints outperforms the
other two, and thus in the following experiments, we only include TapPrints in our competing approaches.
PIN Inference Accuracy in Field Test: To evaluate the inference accuracy of the proposed Snoopy and
competing approaches, we ￿rstly collected a PIN input motion dataset based on the 642 distinct PINs obtained
from the ￿eld test. As in the previous section, we recruited an independent group of 20 participants who hadn’t
contributed any data to enter those PINs on their smartwatches.￿e mean age of participants is 32.3 (  = 10.4,
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Fig. 13. Background distribution. Fig. 14. Gender distribution. Fig. 15. Platform distribution.
Mdn = 31, ranging from 18 to 53), and the data collection process is similar to that in the previous APL case. We
compare the performance of the proposed seq2dgt approach in Snoopy (with and without a￿ention mechanism)
and the best competing algorithm TapPrints on this dataset, and include the naive random guess as the baseline.
As shown in Fig. 12 (Right), both variants of Snoopy(seq2dgt) consistently outperform the TapPrints, and is able
to achieve > 2⇥ accuracy improvement. In particular, with a single chance Snoopy is able to achieve 6% success
rate, which is much higher than random random guess (0.01%). If more a￿empts are allowed, Snoopy can achieve
up to 18% success rate a￿er 10 guesses and 28% within 20 a￿empts.￿e performance of the competing TapPrints
is much lower, and can only make to 11% a￿er 20 a￿empts. In addition, we see that in this case the a￿ention
mechanism provides more performance gain (up to about 10%) comparing to that in the previous APL case.￿is
is because in the case PIN inference, the motion data associated with gaps between two taps is mostly noise,
which won’t provide any useful information for prediction.￿erefore by using the a￿ention mechanism, Snoopy
can e￿ectively ignore those gaps by assigning dynamic weights during decoding, i.e. it would put more weights
on the data segments associated with real taps.
7 USER STUDY
We complement our experimental evaluation of Snoopy with a user study, which aims to understand the users’
awareness of the potential password leak on smartwatches via motion data and its consequences. We distributed
20 40 60 80 100
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Allowed data access
3rd party app disabled
Non-pwd keystroke >3
Smartwatch owner
Set watch unlock pwd
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Fig. 16. Survey results. They were asked 8 questions about smartwacth usage and password se￿ings.
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questionnaires on social media in the UK and China, asking anonymous participants to provide basic demographic
information such as gender, age, occupation and smartwatch platforms used.￿e questionnaire consists of the
following yes-or-no questions:
• Q1: Have you used the same passwords in di￿erent accounts/platforms, e.g., same PIN for PayPal2 and
your device screen lock?
• Q2: Did you know (before this survey) your passcodes on smart devices could be leaked through motion
sensors?
• Q3: Have you allowed or will allow third-party apps on your smart wearable devices to access your
motion data, e.g., allowing WeChat+3 to record the number of steps you’ve walked?
• Q4: Have you disabled or considered disabling third-party apps monitoring your motion data when
entering passwords on your smart device?
• Q5: Do you o￿en type on smartwatches (> 3 times a day), e.g., sending instant messages4 or editing
emails5?
• Q6: Are you a smartwatch owner?
• Q7: Have you set up unlock passwords on your smartwatches?
From two periods, we received 745 anonymous responses for the ￿rst 5 questions and 301 anonymous responses
for the last two questions respectively. Among them we have users from nine di￿erent occupation categories
(Fig. 13), with slightly more male than female (61% vs. 39% as in Fig. 14), and an average age of 32.3 ( =12.1,
Mdn=28, ranging from 18 to 63).￿is is expected since in general, young male users are more willing to try out
new gadgets such as smartwatches. We also observe that Android and iOS dominate the smartwatch market. As
shown in Fig. 15, 39% and 57% of our participants wear Android or Apple watches, while only a tiny percentage
(4%) of them were using other platforms.
Fig 16 summarizes the distribution of answers. First of all, we see that about 25% of our participants are
smartwatch owners, and this number is expected to grow rapidly in the near future according to [30]. Among
those smartwatch owners, we ￿nd that the majority of them (73%) would use unlock passwords for their devices.
￿is indicates that smartwatches are truly becoming pervasive, and users tend to rely on the built-in unlock
passwords (APLs or PINs) to protect their devices. Another key ￿nding is that over 80% of the participants tend
to use the same password across di￿erent applications.￿is means that the consequences of leaking smartwatch
passwords can be signi￿cant: what if the smartwatch PIN is the same PIN used for online banking or Paypal? We
also observe that a large number of users (>60%) did not know that the motion sensors on smart devices may
leak sensitive information. In fact, 76% of the participants would allow, or had already allowed, third-party apps
to access their motion data, and less than 20% of them would consider disabling motion sensors when entering
sensitive information on their devices.￿is shows although motion sensor a￿acks have been extensively studied
in academia, most users are still not aware of this. In addition, we see that unlike smartphones, users seldom
perform complex interactions on smartwatch screens such as typing, since the size of them is much smaller
than phones.￿is means in practice it is easier to detect password input events from other tapping/swiping on
smartwatches, which makes this a more vulnerable a￿ack surface.
8 DISCUSSION
￿is section discusses some important issues related to the proposed Snoopy system. In Sec. 8 we show how
di￿erent motion sensing strategies have knock-on e￿ects on both energy consumption and password inference
2h￿ps://www.paypal.com/gb/home
3h￿ps://www.wechat.com/en/
4h￿ps://hangouts.google.com/
5h￿ps://sparkmailapp.com/
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Sampling
Method
Energy
Consumption
APL PIN
Accuracy (seq2pwd) Accuracy (seq2dgt) Accuracy (seq2dgt)
50 Hz (const) 2.0% per hr 56.1% 25.7% 9.1%
100 Hz (const) 4.4% per hr 61.5% 34.6% 14.4%
200 Hz (const) 6.3% per hr 66.3% 44.5% 23.4%
Snoopy (adaptive) 2.1% per hr 64.5% 42.6% 18.0%
Table 5. Energy consumption and inference accuracy with di￿erent motion sensing strategies (profiled on Sony SW3 watches).
For the first three approaches (50Hz, 100Hz and 200Hz), we constantly sample the motion sensors and directly feed the
data to the inference algorithms. The proposed Snoopy uses an adaptive sensing approach, which uses feature extraction
techniques to only sample high frequency data when the users are entering passwords.
accuracy, and further highlight the bene￿t of the Snoopy front-end. In Sec. 8.2 we discuss the limitation of the
proposed approach, and provide two potential mitigations for such a￿acks.
8.1 Sampling More vs. Sampling Smart
Energy Consumption: As discussed above, the front-end of Snoopy considers an adaptive motion sensing
approach, which uses feature extraction techniques and SVM classi￿ers to detect when the user are entering
passwords on their devices. Of course running feature extraction and SVM on top of motion sensing requires
extra energy, however, as shown in the ￿rst two columns of Tab. 5, the overhead is not excessive: the energy
consumption of Snoopy front-end is very similar to that of constantly sampling 50Hz motion data, and is only
1/3 of the 200Hz approach. Note that the adaptive sensing mechanism in Snoopy constantly tasks accelerometers
at 40Hz, and triggers both accelerometer and gyroscope at 200Hz when the classi￿er ￿res.￿is con￿rms that
comparing to sampling motion data at high freq, the extra energy consumption required by Snoopy front-end is
cheaper.
Password Inference Accuracy: We would also like to investigate the impact on password inference accuracy
of di￿erent motion sensing strategies. Here we consider the inference results within 10 a￿empts. Obviously
sampling higher frequency of motion data would help password inference, since the raw data itself contains more
information. As shown in the right three columns of Tab. 5, constantly sampling 200Hz motion data gives the
best password inference accuracy: 66.3% for APL while 23.4% for PIN. However as discussed above, the energy
consumption can be prohibitively high: it would drain on average 6.3% of ba￿ery per hour, which can easily
halve the typical smartwatch lifetime [35]. On the other hand, we see that by using the adaptive motion sensing
strategies, Snoopy is able to achieve comparable password inference accuracy: 64.5% for APL and 18.0% for PIN,
while keep the energy consumption much lower. We also observe that the Snoopy front-end works be￿er for
APLs than PINs: the gaps comparing to 200Hz(const) are ⇠2% and ⇠5% respectively.￿is is because the adaptive
sampling strategy tends to have a slight delay to switch to the high sampling rate mode when the user is starting
to entering passwords, and thus could lose a small chunk of motion data at the beginning. For APLs it won’t
a￿ect inference much since the swiping event is continuous: one can use later data to smooth the sequence.
For PINs, this is more sensitive since such data can o￿en determine the ￿rst digit of the password and has an
important impact on inference.
8.2 Possible Mitigations
Like most of the other side-channel a￿acks, Snoopy exploits the correspondence between the leaked motion data
and the contents of entered passwords. Here we propose two possible types of countermeasures.
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Context-aware Motion Sensor Access: One promising mitigation strategy is to enable context-aware motion
sensor access, as proposed in [23]. ￿e idea is to control the access level of motion sensors given the speci￿c
context, e.g. when users are typing on the touchscreen, it is be￿er to limit motion sensor access, especially to
those untrusted 3rd party applications. Depending on di￿erent context, one could consider control policies such
as complete access blocking, reading order randomization and sampling rate reduction. However, the former two
may have signi￿cant negative impact on some normal motion-dependent applications such as ￿tness apps, while
the la￿er is more desirable in practice.
Eliminate Motion-Password Correspondence: ￿e other possible countermeasure is to remove the one-to-
one mapping between user generated motion data and password contents. For instance, we may insert noise to
the motion data during password input, e.g. use random vibrations when the users tap or swipe, or randomly
change the positions of the digits each time when users are required to authenticate, or generates di￿erent
password keypads dynamically [31]. Or alternatively, one can establish more types of correspondence between
the users and their passwords, e.g. using the particular tapping or swiping behaviour of a user to add another
layer of authentication on top of standard PINs/APLs [45].
9 RELATED WORK
Attacking secrets via Side-channel: Leveraging physical sensors as a side to a￿ack secrets has recently
received lots of a￿ention. ￿e authors found that the MEMS gyro sensors are able to pick up low-frequency
vibrations from ambient sounds. Aviv et al. demonstrated that it is possible to reconstruct a locking pa￿ern by
analyzing the oily residues le￿ on the screen [4]. ￿is method has limited application as oily residues can be
altered by other on-screen activities a￿er pa￿ern drawing, and also requires an a￿acker to have physical access
to the device. Li et al. proposed a keystroke inference framework using variations in WiFi signals.￿ey observe
that keystrokes on mobile devices will lead to di￿erent hand positions and ￿nger motion which alter the channel
properties, re￿ected in the channel state information (CSI). A similar idea is proposed in [1], where WiFi CSI is
used to infer keystrokes on a physical keyboard. However, these classes of a￿acks require similar environments
and are highly sensitive to nearby moving objects. Vision-based a￿acks are also well established. Shukla et al. [32]
used video footage captured near the victim to decode the PIN entered on the smartphone. Ye et al. [43] recently
extend [32] to APL and their method is robust to di￿erent lighting conditions.￿ough video-based side-channel
a￿acks are very e￿cient in determining passwords, it is di￿cult for the a￿ackers to access and locate video
footage containing password input events. Compared with the above more direct a￿acks, eavesdropping motion
sensor data is robust to environmental dynamics, is scalable, and can be achieved discreetly by a malicious app.
On the hand, due to their motion tracking capability and pervasiveness, motion sensors are popular side channels
for a￿ackers. Gyrophone [27] presents a new type of threat to intercept human speech by using a smartphone
gyroscope. Marquardt et al. demonstrated the (Sp) iPhone, and show that it is possible to use the accelerometer
within an iPhone to recover text entered on a keyboard when the phone is placed nearby on a rigid surface [24].
Inferring Secrets on Smart Devices via Motion Sensors: Researchers have a￿empted to infer keystrokes
on smart wearables via motion sensors [5, 7, 26, 28, 29, 42].￿e core idea behind these works is similar to the
aim of Snoopy: keystrokes on device screen lead to distinct force/a￿itude pa￿erns.￿e motion data on smart
wearables can thus be used to infer entered secrets. TouchLogger [7, 8] and ACCessory [29] are early works,
where ACCessory uses accelerometer only and TouchLogger utilizes both accelerometer and gyroscope to infer
PINs. Similarly, TapLogger [42] re￿nes previous techniques and uses a gyroscope to predict PIN-like secrets on
smartphones. TapLogger uses a k-means clustering approach to extract the most likely classes (typically top
3). Given substantial observations of the secret (e.g. 32 PIN entry events), this is su￿cient to estimate the true
secret. Note that TapLogger uses manually extracted statistical features. TapPrints [28] advances the technique
and extends inference capability beyond digits to English words.￿e papers mentioned above require accurate
digit-wise classi￿cation, which is hard to achieve with smartwatch motion data (as shown in Sec. 6). In contrast,
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GestureLogger [5] infers keystrokes in an end-to-end manner rather than individually identifying each tapped
digit. To this end, GestureLogger ￿rstly designs a password database of 50 graphical passwords and 50 numerical
PINs as possible passwords. It then develops a sequence classi￿er that infers the most likely match given the
motion data sequence. However, GestureLogger uses handcra￿ed features for inference, which is not robust to the
variability of scenarios [18]. For example, as demonstrated in experimental results (Sec. 6), the features designed
for smartphones in GestureLogger did not work well in the context of smartwatches.￿ough redesigning new
features for smartwatches is possible but the process needs domain knowledge (e.g., motion sensors). Unlike all
the above, Snoopy is the only one using deep neural networks that is able to learn the best feature representations
automatically through learning; its password inference framework can be easily applied to new scenarios without
domain knowledge about the functioned sensors.
While TapPrints is speci￿cally tailored to inferring PIN passwords, we provide a uniform approach that can be
used to infer both PIN and APL (swiped) passwords. Even if one focuses on PINs only, we demonstrate a 2.5
fold improvement in accuracy compared to TapPrints. ￿is is because TapPrints decouples the problems of
segmentation and classi￿cation into two separate steps, whereas our approach handles them more robustly by
tackling both tasks using the same Deep Neural Network architecture. When compared to previous work that
has focused on APLs (GestureLogger), our work is fundamentally di￿erent as it can address not only APLs that
exist in the training dataset, but also new previously unseen APLs.￿is is a signi￿cant bene￿t that increases the
impact of the a￿ack. As we can see in Tab. 6, Snoopy is the only approach requires li￿le domain knowledge on
a￿ackers’ side, which signi￿cantly lower the bar for a￿ack deployment. In addition, whereas all prior art has
focused on smartphones, we address the problem in the context of smartwatches.￿is is a far more challenging
scenario, due to low SNR, in which previous approaches show very low performance compared to the proposed
approach.
Work ParticipantsNumber
Domain Knowledge
Required for Attackers PasswordExtraction
PWD
Type Cross-user
Cross-device
+ Cross-userDigit/swipe
Segmentation
Feature
Engineering
TouchLogger
[7, 8] 1 X X 7 PIN 7 7
ACCessory
[29] 4 X X 7 PIN 7 7
TapLogger
[42] 3 X X X PIN 7 7
TapPrints
[28] 10 X X X PIN 7 7
GestureLogger
[5] 24 X X 7
APL
PIN X 7
Snoopy
(proposed) 362 7 7 X
APL
PIN X X
Table 6. Comparison of related works and Snoopy in password inference.
Smartwatch Security: As an increasingly ubiquitous device, the smartwatch has triggered new security issues.
Wang et al. [40] and Liu et al. [20] pioneered this thread and have demonstrated the feasibility of inferring
keystrokes on QWERTY keyboards by smartwatches.￿eir idea is that the keystroke-induced motions can be
read from the motion sensors as long as smartwatches are worn on victims’ wrists. Similar risks are also reported
on the ATM machines, where victims’ digital PINs are leaked through motion sensors on smartwatches. Maiti et
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al. [23] proposed a context-aware protection mechanism which identi￿es sensitive motion events (e.g., typing on
the keyboard) and trigger sensor access controller accordingly.￿e protection mechanism has been proved to
work e￿ectively to mitigate smartwatch based side-channel a￿acks with least interruption for the third-party
applications.
￿ough Snoopy is an a￿ack framework based on smartwatch, the goals are fundamentally di￿erent. Above
works use smartwatches as a side channel to infer secrets entered on external devices, while Snoopy thrives to
infer the inputs entered into the watch through it screen.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of password leaking on smartwatches via the on-board motion sensors.
Although side-channel a￿acks based on motion data have been widely investigated on smartphones, the problem
has so far been overlooked on smartwatch platforms. As a result, users are not fully aware of the risks and potential
consequences. To our knowledge, this is the ￿rst work that demonstrates the feasibility of a￿acking passwords
(PIN and Android Pa￿ern Lock) on smartwatches using motion sensors.￿e proposed Snoopy system can disguise
itself as a normal app (for ￿tness or wellbeing monitoring), and can successfully eavesdrop motion data in the
background while passwords are entered. ￿e extracted motion data is uploaded to the cloud, where Snoopy
infers the contents of passwords using deep neural networks trained with crowd-sourced data. We collected large
scale datasets (3 di￿erent sites, 362 users and >50k password entires), and compared the performance of Snoopy
with state-of-the-art methods proposed for smartphones. Our ￿ndings are: a) Snoopy can accurately extract
the password-positive segments of motion data (up to 98% accuracy) in real-time on smartwatches, without
consuming signi￿cant power/computational resources; b) although it is more challenging to infer passwords on
smartwatches due to the much lower signal-to-noise ratio, Snoopy is able to achieve up to 95% success rates when
a￿acking Android Pa￿ern Lock within 10 a￿empts and 86% for PIN numbers (the best competing approaches
achieving 23% and 30% respectively); c) Snoopy is robust to user and device heterogeneity. Compared with the
best competing approach, it o￿erso￿ers a ⇠ 3-fold improvement in the accuracy of inferring passwords. d) in
practice it is vital to select the appropriate deep network architecture and regularisation parameters for Snoopy to
work well. In summary, through the use of state-of-the-art deep learning, we have presented a universal technique
that works for both PINs and pa￿ern locks, without requiring any hand-engineering of features. By lowering the
barrier to a￿ackers in terms of engineering e￿ort, the likelihood of being able to successfully compromise smart
devices becomes signi￿cantly higher, simply by harvesting innocuous motion data from victims. In light of these
risks, we recommend that motion sensors should be regarded as a carrying a far higher security risk than they
currently are, and should have adequate countermeasures in place or require increased permissions.
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APPENDIX
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) based Sequence Learning
In our context, the task of password inference is essentially learning a function between the password related
motion data to the ￿nite labels in the password database P .￿e motion data is inherently a time series, which
captures the continuous posture changes of the smartwatch induced by user tapping or swiping. In addition, our
problem is more challenging than standard sequence modelling since a) the input length can be variable, e.g.
APLs can have di￿erent lengths, and b) the temporal correlations within data are strong, e.g. the likelihood of
tapping on or swiping to a particular position depends very much on previous taps/swipes.￿erefore, in this
paper we use RNNs to model the motion data, which can take arbitrary length of input, and return the most
likely password as output. In the following we explain how the standard RNN architecture solves this type of
sequence learning problem. In the last two subsections we describe how to extend the standard architecture to
cope with our particular password inference problems.
Basic RNN Architecture: Concretely, at each timestamp k a standard RNN keeps an internal hidden state hk to
describe the temporal dependencies, and given an input xk , the RNN updates its state by:
hk = H (Wxhxk +Whhhk 1 + bh )
uk =Whuhk + bu
(6)
whereWxh ,Whh are the weights of the current input xk and previous state hk 1, and bh is the bias vector. H is
an element-wise non-linear activation function, e.g., sigmoid or hyperbolic tangent function.￿e network output
uk is evaluated as a linear combination of the updated hidden state hk and a bias vector bu .
In practice, uk may appear at multiple timestamp, or only exist at a single (in most cases the last) timestamp.
￿e former type of network is able to map the input sequence to an output sequence, which is particularly useful
in scenarios such as machine translation.￿e la￿er type generates a single output, for example a label based on
the input sequence, and thus is o￿en considered in applications such as text sentimental analysis. As discussed
above, the password inference problem studied in this paper is to compute the most likely password (i.e. label)
within the database P given the sequence of motion data, which falls naturally into the la￿er category.￿erefore
in the following text, we only focus on those RNNs with a single output node, as shown in Fig.5 (Le￿).
RNNs with LSTMs: Although in theory the basic RNN is able to model sequences with arbitrary length, in
practice it o￿en su￿ers from the gradient vanishing and exploding problems [14]. ￿at is, it cannot capture
the long-term dependencies well when the length of input sequences becomes large.￿erefore for long input
sequences, RNNs with Long Short Term Memory units (LSTMs) [15] are o￿en considered. Essentially, LSTMs
use self recurrent units (memory cells) to explicitly determine which previous hidden states to “remember” or
“forget”, and thus provides a memory mechanism to capture dependencies spanning over many timesteps in the
past. Fig. 17 shows an example of the LSTM units, in which the gates (forget/input/output) control the ￿ow of
information. Formally, the LSTM updates its own cell state ck and the hidden state hk as follows:
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Fig. 17. Folded and unfolded LSTMs and the internal structures of its unit.   and   denote element-wise product and
addition of two vectors, respectively.
ik =   (Wxixk +Whihk 1 + bi )
gk = tanh(Wx xk +Wh hk 1 + b  )
fk =   (Wxf xk +Whf hk 1 + bf )
ck = fk   ck 1 + ik   gk
ok =   (Wxoxk +Whohk 1 + bo )
hk = ok   tanh(ck )
(7)
where ik and gk are the input gates, i.e. govern which information in the previous hidden state hk 1 to remember,
while fk is the forget gate that controls which part in hk 1 to forget, given the current input xk .￿e cell state ck
of this LSTM unit is then updated by combining information from those gates. ok is the output gate, which is
then fused with the current cell state ck to update the hidden state hk. Note that   is the sigmoid function, tanh
is the hyperbolic tangent function, and   is the element-wise product between vectors.
Cost Function and Optimisation: Given an input sequence X = (x1,x2, · · · ,xT ) with length ofT (in our case
the 6 axis motion data), the above RNN essentially computes the likelihood of the labels   2 {1, 2, · · · ,M }:
p (  |X) = p (  |x1,x2, · · · ,xT )
= so f tmax (WhuhT + bu )
(8)
where we assume there isM possible labels in total. If the true label   is known for the input sequence X, then
training the network is equivalent to ￿nding the optimal parameters (weights)   where:
  ⇤ = argmax
 
p (  |X;  ) (9)
In practice, we typically use the cross entropy errors between the predicted and true labels as the cost function,
which is de￿ned as:
L (X, ) =
MX
j=1
1{  = j} logp (D j ) (10)
where p (D j ) 2 [0, 1] is the probability of label j predicted by the network, and 1{  = j} is an indicator function
which returns 1 if the true label   is j . To optimize this cost function, there are various gradient-based techniques
such as AdaGrad [10] and RMSProp [36]. In this paper we use Adam [16], which combines the advantage of the
two and is very e￿cient for training deep RNNs with LSTMs.
Regularization: Like other deep neuronal networks, the above RNNs with LSTMs can get over￿t quickly.
￿is is because by design the input of the network can have arbitrary length while the dimension of the output
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is ￿xed. ￿erefore through training, the RNNs tend to learn an input-dependent transition operator, which
governs how to “fold” the variable length input sequences into the hidden states and “squeeze” them into ￿xed
output vectors. However, as the training set won’t cover sequences with all possible lengths, when applying the
learned transition operator to an unseen test sequence, the dynamics of RNNs can be very sensitive to minor
perturbations in the hidden states at di￿erent timestamps [17].￿erefore to make the RNNs practically useful,
we need good regularization techniques to balance the ￿tness of training and generalization capability. In this
paper, we consider a dropout technique inspired by [44], which randomly shuts down a subset of the network
by disabling the corresponding feed-forward connections during training. ￿erefore, the dropout technique
deliberately corrupts the information maintained by the memory units at some timestamps, but not all of them.
In this way, we force the network to learn the general knowledge but not just speci￿c features in the training
data, and thus make it more robust in practice.
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